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Beyond Pragmatic Sociology: A Theoretical  
Compromise between ‘Critical Sociology’ and  
the ‘Pragmatic Sociology of  Critique’
Mohamed Nachi
Introduction
The 1980s witnessed a remarkable change in the social sciences, a significant 
renewal of  sociological theory. In France it was an occasion to discover and 
appreciate, albeit with significant delay, the contribution of  Anglo-Saxon 
sociological currents which had earlier been dismissed or underestimated, 
such as symbolic interactionism, ethno-methodology, and phenomenological 
sociology. Through the 1960s and 1970s, French sociology was limited mainly 
to four major currents, which Alain Touraine proposed to call ‘the four 
corners of  sociology’, represented by Raymond Boudon, Pierre Bourdieu, 
Michel Crozier, and Alain Touraine himself. The debates in the social sciences 
during this period significantly turned around two paradigms: Marxism and 
structuralism. No one would deny the importance of  these debates or diminish 
the role they played, but it is equally indisputable that, because of  a polarization 
that constrained fertile exchange, they prevented the development of  other 
sociological perspectives. In this intellectual configuration, the sociology of  
Pierre Bourdieu clearly occupied the foreground, bringing about a major 
renewal of  social theory. In fact, pragmatic sociology, which shall be examined 
in this chapter, is part of  its aftermath, even if  its founders sought to elaborate 
a new model of  analysis that would break with some key epistemological 
premises underlying Bourdieu’s genetic structuralism. 
Ensuing decades saw the emergence and development of  new configurations 
in the social sciences, a refocusing of  theoretical problems particularly around 
an analysis according to regimes of  action, assessment, justification, and 
convention. The plurality of  action through diverse modes of  engagement in the 
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world – this is what Laurent Thévenot proposes in his latest book (Thévenot, 
2006). More generally, the emergence of  the pragmatic style in France can be 
located in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One may suggest that it shares 
some theoretical presuppositions with the anthropology of  science (Latour, 
1988), and with the economy of  conventions (Batifoulier, 2001). Amongst 
other things, it borrows from the first the concept of  ‘test’ (épreuve) and uses 
the conventionalist perspective for the grammatical construction of  regimes of  action 
and justice (Nachi, 2006a). This style succeeded in quickly conquering the 
scientific field and the space of  research and debate in the social sciences – 
especially in sociology, anthropology, economics, and history. It shares several 
central features with pragmatic sociology and the anthropology of  sciences. 
Still, one should not construe it as a single current, nor regard it as a unified 
paradigmatic programme. In fact, behind a shared epistemology and the 
recourse to proximate methodological tools and vocabularies, one finds 
significantly differing objects of  investigation and theoretical preoccupations.
The programme established by Boltanski and Thévenot aimed to 
distinguish itself  from Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’, which the two scholars 
accused of  proposing a totalizing account of  society – an account that, in 
terms of  its popularity, had reached a saturation threshold. Hence they tried 
to elaborate a model of  analysis capable of  taking seriously the justifications 
provided by ordinary people in their performative actions – that is, in 
their shared effort to adjust to various situations of  daily life. The point 
of  departure had been the analysis of  operations of  categorization and 
classification necessary for the construction of  nomenclatures (Boltanski 
and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]) and, thus, of  ordinary operations of  judgement 
and public denunciation (Boltanski, Darré, and Schiltz, 1984). The two 
researchers sought to comprehend the modes of  equivalence – as well as the 
operations of  judgement, qualification, adjustment, and justification – by way of  which 
agreements and compromises are made and unmade in the course of  action 
coordination processes. On this view, what is at stake is the possibility of  
observing and understanding the multiple ways in which individuals create 
orders of  worth with which they can denounce an injustice or explain the 
normative character of  a given situation or action.
In order to put this programme to work, pragmatic sociology equipped 
itself  with a theoretical model and a conceptual apparatus that were entirely 
novel and were elaborated in great detail in On Justification (2006 [1991]). 
Untrained readers and those unfamiliar with the style may find this book 
somewhat inaccessible, and so I took it upon myself  to ease comprehension 
of  the theoretical model in an introductory volume entitled Introduction à la 
sociologie pragmatique : Vers un nouveau style sociologique [Introduction to pragmatic 
sociology: Towards a new sociological style] (Nachi, 2006a). 
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The model of  Economies of  Worth (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]; 
henceforth, EW) seeks to resolve the problem of  coordinated actions in 
relation to a plurality of  orders of  worth. Agreement alone can no longer 
be presupposed since there are inevitable tensions between different forms 
of  reaching agreement, and because even a legitimate agreement can be 
questioned at any moment in the name of  another legitimate principle, thus 
necessitating compromise (Nachi, 2011). Boltanski and Thévenot clearly assert 
their commitment to ‘treat instances of  agreement reaching and critique as 
intimately linked occurrences within a single continuum of  action’ (Boltanski 
and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]: 25). The hypothesis of  a plurality of  worlds 
becomes, as a result, the necessary condition to surmount the conflict between 
different worlds and different orders of  worth. 
A number of  critical points were made following the publication of  the initial 
model of  EW. In responding to the most important amongst them, Boltanski 
proceeded with profound revisions of  the theoretical foundations of  pragmatic 
sociology. First, he introduced some inflections in The New Spirit of  Capitalism 
(2005 [1999]; henceforth NSC), but it is mostly in The Foetal Condition (2013 
[2004]) that he proposed a more radical change, now adopting an approach 
that combines pragmatic sociology, structuralism, and phenomenology. More 
recently still, his penultimate book, entitled On Critique (2011 [2009]), made 
the additional step of  grappling anew with the question of  domination and of  
emancipation, thus coming closer to Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’. It seems, 
therefore, appropriate to reflect on the nature of  these theoretical shifts. Is 
pragmatic sociology reconfigured, or is it overcome?
My purpose in this chapter is to revisit the stakes motivating these revisions 
and adjustments insofar as they offer a new theoretical compromise. I ask 
about the rapport of  ‘critical sociology’ with the ‘sociology of  critique’, 
indeed, about the aftermath of  a step that had replaced ‘critical sociology’ 
with the ‘sociology of  critique’. Are we now witnessing a reversal of  this 
substitution and the possibility of  a return to Bourdieusian sociology? Be 
that as it may, the lesson to keep in mind is that we are confronted not 
with a ‘complete’ sociological style but, rather, with an incomplete theoretical 
construction, which is under constant reconstruction. Its author seeks to 
overcome internal contradictions and insufficiencies, aiming to make sense 
of  realities that are plural and complex. I wish to address this construction 
process in this chapter. I will begin this analysis with theoretical inflections 
and hybridizations that can be found in the first version of  the EW model 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]), proceeding towards the possibility 
of  finding a compromise between ‘critical sociology’ and the ‘pragmatic 
sociology of  critique’ – a project that creates new problems and raises new 
questions.
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I. Inflections
In the optic of  the EW model, ‘polities’ are historical constructions as well 
as ideal concepts, which must not be confused with reality. It is nevertheless 
possible to describe their genesis and development on the basis of  ‘grammars 
of  the political’ which obtain their legitimacy as systems of  constraints 
answerable to the institution of  a legitimate order of  worth. Such a model of  
polities has not been seen as inevitable or as unchanging. On the contrary, it 
is presented, from its very inception, as open to other eventualities, in order 
to forecast an evolution and even the advent of  other polities. In other words, 
the analytic framework proposed by the early EW model allowed for the 
notion that new polities might emerge in order to answer new exigencies of  
justification and justice. Boltanski and Thévenot formulate the hypothesis that 
the formation of  polities is of  general importance at a particular point in time. 
It is also true that, in order to stabilize themselves, polities require a social 
anchoring, relating to a specific historical configuration. Evidently, none of  
this applies to all societies; it applies only to those marked by modern political 
philosophies. Ultimately, the six polities identified by Boltanski and Thévenot 
are not merely limited in number. They testify to a specific concern with 
contemporary societies. It is for this reason that subsequent work has revealed 
the existence of  other polities. For example, the last transformation of  the 
spirit of  capitalism created a new polity designated ‘connectionist’ (Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2005 [1999]).
Pursuing a similar vision, later works have raised the possibility of  other 
polities. The earliest was the attempt made by Claudette Lafaye and Laurent 
Thévenot (Lafaye and Thévenot, 1993), who, based on the expression of  
disagreements and conflicts with regard to the management of  nature and 
the invocation of  ecological justification, have offered the hypothesis of  a new 
‘green city’ in construction (Lafaye and Thévenot, 1993). This construction was 
revealed as contradicting some of  the constitutive principles of  the axiomatic 
in the polities model. Moreover, there were criticisms, amongst them Bruno 
Latour’s, for whom there could not be an ecological polity since the questions 
it addressed are already plausibly addressed in the six original polities (Latour, 
1998: 222). This early attempt clearly failed to reach its goal. Not so for the 
possibility of  a seventh – ‘connectionist’ – polity proposed by Boltanski and 
Chiapello in NSC (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005 [1999]), the contours of  
which have to be sketched. In order to do so, this chapter will summarize 
the general problematic of  the book as a whole, underscoring some of  the 
inflections introduced there with regard to the general architecture of  the polity.
Boltanski and Chiapello offer an audacious and unprecedented analysis of  
transformations in the spirit of  capitalism. The book is an ‘encyclopaedic summa’, 
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which can be intimidating not only due to its sheer volume (over five hundred 
pages), but also in terms of  its theoretical and empirical scope. Obviously, I will 
not be offering an exhaustive synthesis. I merely wish to render explicit some 
aspects that may help us understand how the authors succeed in constructing a 
seventh polity, by way of  some inflections with regard to the initial EW model. The 
purpose of  the book is to analyse ‘the ideological changes that have accompanied 
recent transformations in capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005 [1999]: 3).
The perspective adopted is not concerned with the study of  the mutations 
that have affected social structures or the economic infrastructure (in the 
Marxist sense of  the term). Rather, its aim is to understand ‘the way in which 
the ideologies associated with economic activity are altered’ (ibid.). This clearly 
follows the general line of  Max Weber’s study The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of  Capitalism (2001 [1930]). The very decision to echo Weber’s title is hardly 
fortuitous. The bulk of  the analysis revolves around three main actors (actants) 
that are essential to the three parts of  the book – namely, capitalism, the spirit 
of  capitalism, and critique. What the authors seek to clarify are the relations and 
articulations established and operative between the three, while taking into 
account the manner in which they affect the ideological sphere in the final 
decades of  the twentieth century (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005 [1999]: 4).
1. From on Justification to the New Spirit of  Capitalism:  
Continuity or Rupture, or Both? 
Clearly, the spirit of  capitalism is apprehended out of  the justifications that aim 
to provide it with legitimate normative support. The authors retain the basic 
matrix of  the EW model, granting the concept of  polity a central role as the 
normative fulcrum for the construction of  justifications: 
Inasmuch as they are subject to an imperative of  justification, social arrangements 
tend to incorporate reference to a kind of  very general convention directed 
towards a common good, and claiming universal validity, which has been 
modelled on the concept of  the city. (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]: 22; 
italics in original) 
From the perspective of  pragmatic sociology, the spirit of  capitalism includes 
a reference to such conventions (at least in those aspects that are oriented 
towards justice). It presupposes access to two different levels.
The first contains an agent capable of  actions conducive to profit creation, whereas 
the second contains an agent equipped with a greater degree of  reflexivity, who 
judges the actions of  the first in the name of  universal principles. (Ibid.: 22) 
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The model of  polities is itself  oriented towards the question of  justice, which 
implies a simultaneous treatment of  agreement and of  critique as inseparable 
moments tied to action (Nachi, 2006a). 
By adopting such a perspective, the authors seek to distinguish themselves 
from critical theories (Marxism, Frankfurt School, Bourdieu) that tend to 
conceive of  society exclusively in terms of  domination, power relations, 
exploitation, and conflicts of  interest. In addition, they aim to differentiate 
themselves from Kantian and contractual theories (for instance, those 
developed by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas), since these approaches 
tend to overemphasize the sociological significance of  ‘public debate’ and 
‘democratic deliberation’, along with the procedural foundation of  political 
justice, but without paying sufficient attention to its evaluation, thereby 
underestimating the importance of  a contradictory and conflictual reality in 
people’s lifeworlds (Nachi, 2006b).
In works deriving from the first current, the description of  the world seems too 
grim to be true: such a world would not be habitable for very long. But in works 
related to the second, the social world is, it must be confessed, a little too rosy to 
be credible. (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005 [1999]: 27) 
The very concept of  critique avoids this theoretical polarization to the extent 
that critique
is meaningful only when there is a difference between a desirable and an actual 
state of  affairs. To give critique the place that falls to it in the social world, we 
must stop reducing justice to force, or allowing ourselves to be blinded by the 
existence of  justice to the point where we ignore relations of  force. (Ibid.: 27–28).
The position adopted by the authors caused some embarrassment 
amongst adepts of  pragmatic sociology, established – one must recall – in 
opposition to Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’. The agenda was in 
fact to replace ‘critical sociology’ with the ‘sociology of  critique’. One 
of  the epistemological principles underpinning the model of  polities 
aims to abolish the dividing line, the alleged gap between common sense 
and scientific explanation. It conceives of  the explanatory knowledge 
generated by the sociologist as a second-order construct, to invoke Alfred 
Schütz. This is essential to granting persons the competency required for 
the exercise of  critical judgement, and it was the original contribution of  
Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology’ in relation to Bourdieu’s ‘sociology of  
unveiling’. Barely a decade after its initial formulation, this basic principle 
is now undermined. This is no doubt a sign of  inflection of  the analytic 
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framework in pragmatic sociology. How is this sign to be interpreted? This 
inflection did not escape notice. Some authors of  Marxist persuasion saw 
in it a ‘resolutely critical’ reversal, even a return to Marxist critique. So 
Jacques Bidet, for instance, claimed that
compared with On Justification, NSC expresses a radically critical political position 
as well as a far-reaching ambition, which – in a field of  elective affinities – includes 
the heterodox approaches of  regulation and even of  Marxism. (Bidet, 2002: 230)
I recognized, as did Philippe Corcuff, ‘an early overture towards a new social 
critique’ (see Corcuff, 2000), signs of  continuity and discontinuity with the 
earlier work conducted by Boltanski and Thévenot. 
Some continuities are first discernible in the quest after an alternative sociology –  
that of  Bourdieu – focused too exclusively on ‘domination’ and on ‘power 
relations’, manifesting a concern to make space for the goals of  justice and the 
moral constraints operating in social action […]. In continuity and discontinuity 
of  the dotted lines that mark critique, NSC systematizes and radicalizes the 
critical approach, going so far as to unveil a new form of  exploitation […]. Or, 
more directly renewing social critique, Boltanski and Chiapello are led to free 
themselves from the framework of  a pragmatic sociology, understood here as a 
second-order construct. The macro-social entities they invoke (capitalism, spirit 
of  capitalism, and critique) and the historical narrative into which they step (from 
the crisis of  May 68 to the rise of  connectionist neo-capitalism in the 1990s) tend 
to command over the actors participating in it […]. We are dealing with a true 
break in pragmatic sociology. (Corcuff, 2000: 223–224; my translation) 
Corcuff ’s analysis is no doubt valid, but it seems to me that Boltanski and 
Chiapello are not performing a break with pragmatic sociology. Theirs 
is rather an inflection, and more precisely, a displacement, the aim of  which is 
to rectify the ‘pragmatic excess’ that has been revealed, thereby taking into 
account the criticisms deemed pertinent and directed at the EW model. In a 
later study, Boltanski responds in detail to these different points of  criticism 
and refines the position he adopted in NSC: 
One of  the aims of  NSC was to answer to objections. It led us, Ève Chiapello and 
myself, to modify significantly the framework that was presented in On Justification. 
We particularly sought to develop a dynamic that would enable us to account for 
the emergence of  new normative points of  support and, in this precise case, for 
the ongoing formation of  a new city, which we have called ‘the projective city’. 
(Boltanski, 2002: 285; my translation)
300 THE SPIRIT OF LUC BOLTANSKI
The critical posture adopted in NSC seems to me to have remained consistent 
with the conception articulated by Michael Walzer, who considers that social 
critique must be understood as a form of  critical interpretation (Walzer, 1993: 
vii). From this perspective, critique is internal; it is predicated on a common 
sense shared in society, and it therefore refuses to claim an overarching view. 
In this respect, the orientation chosen in NSC does not seem to me to infringe 
upon this rule. My conclusion converges with the position defended by Claude 
Gautier. NSC is located on a very relative line of  continuity with earlier works 
devoted to an elaboration of  a ‘pragmatic sociology of  critique’ (Gautier, 2001: 
197). Even if  it owes much to the EW model, NSC must be treated on its own 
terms, representing as it does a definite culmination in Boltanski’s intellectual 
trajectory. It is a fulfilment, a renewal even, of  the analytic framework of  
pragmatic sociology. By constructing a model of  normative change, it offers, in 
fact, an ambitious and original analysis of  the ideological transformations and 
forms of  legitimation of  the new spirit of  capitalism by constructing a model 
of  normative change (Boltanski, 2002: 286). It proposes a general explanation 
of  a new ideological configuration out of  empirical data (the discourse of  
management from the 1970s to the 1990s), articulating within a single and 
coherent framework the processes of  description, interpretation, and explanation. 
2. Inflections of  the Initial Framework  
of  the Polities Model
As already noted, NSC introduces a series of  inflections with regard to the 
initial model of  polities. In fact, analysis of  the transformations of  the spirit 
of  capitalism led the authors to clarify certain fundamental concepts and to 
revisit some litigious points of  the analytic framework in its original version. 
For example, this is the case with the concept of  ‘test’, the early formulation of  
which failed to take into account relations of  power and, above all, relations 
and actions of  a non-institutional nature. Thus redefinition of  the concept 
introduces an important distinction between ‘tests of  strength’ and ‘legitimate 
tests’, one with which I have dealt at some length elsewhere (Nachi, 2006a: ch. 
1; § II.4). I have also had occasion to account for another theoretical revision, 
concerned this time with the controversial hypothesis of  the non-attachment 
of  worth to individuals (Nachi, 2006a: ch. 3; § I.7). I tried to show that, in 
2004, Boltanski disclaimed this hypothesis by underscoring the analysis of  
singularization processes, showing that individuals have fixed attributes, if  only 
by way of  rigid designators (after Kripke), such as proper names, for instance. 
These fixed attributes are indefinitely attached to the identity of  individuals 
and are therefore consubstantial with regard to the specificity of  individual 
personality.
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There was another modification of  the EW model consisting of  the 
identification of  a new polity in formation – the ‘projective city’ – brought 
about by the transformation of  the new spirit of  capitalism and the emergence 
of  an ordinary sense of  justice in accordance with a connectionist world. This 
world should be the extension of  the ‘projects-oriented polity’ (cité par projets), 
which is organized by networks, flexibility, autonomy, etc., and described as 
connectionist and reticular in nature (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005 [1999]).
Beyond these various inflections, there is another essential aspect marking 
a difference of  posture in relation to critique. In their early works, which led 
to the construction of  the polities model, Boltanski and Thévenot advocated 
the ‘acritical posture’ of  the sociologist, considering that ordinary people are 
capable of  critique. Assuming an overarching position is, therefore, superfluous 
and may even impede the work of  the sociologist. It is the ‘critical sociology’ 
developed by Pierre Bourdieu which is relevant in this context. The alternative 
proposed was to break with this posture and to replace ‘critical sociology’ with a 
‘pragmatic sociology of  critique’. In NSC the authors do not abandon the idea of  
studying critical operations since the very object of  their work is the critique 
of  capitalism, but in contradistinction with the EW model, they themselves assume 
a critical position, which should be a priori contrary to the pragmatic position 
defended in earlier works. Ultimately, we know very well that the question of  
critique suffuses the whole of  pragmatic sociology. It might even be at the origin 
of  the polities model. And yet, in NSC it assumes a new form, expressed in 
the object of  analysis – the critique of  capitalism being one of  the three central 
actors (actants) of  the book – as well as in the critical position taken vis-à-vis 
the evolution of  the ideology legitimizing the spirit of  capitalism (Callinicos, 
2006). The attempt here aims to articulate two postures of  critique that were 
initially deemed incompatible, even antagonistic – namely, ‘critical sociology’ 
and the ‘pragmatic sociology of  critique’. This attempt is undertaken, to a 
considerable extent, in Boltanski’s On Critique, as we shall see below. 
This shift of  perspective led the authors to formulate a series of  propositions 
for social and juridical reforms, which would lead to the establishment of  a 
‘projective city’. In this sense, they write that
our intention was not merely sociological, directed towards knowledge, but geared 
to a revival of  political action, understood as the formation and implementation 
of  a collective will regarding our way of  life. (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005 
[1999]: xliv) 
For this reason, as Corcuff  notes, the perspective adopted in NSC is best located 
between pragmatic sociology and macro-sociology (Corcuff, 2000: 223). We 
now see that in 2004 Boltanski took another significant step, which led him 
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further away from pragmatic sociology as originally conceived. He introduced 
the phenomenology of  Michel Henry and, as strange as this may appear, the 
structuralism of  Claude Lévi-Strauss.
II. Hybridization
According to a number of  commentators, The Foetal Condition (Boltanski, 2013 
[2004]) is a disconcerting and ‘terrible’ book (Karsenti, 2005), because of  the 
subject treated and because of  the problematic elaborated by Boltanski in 
this study. The book appears similar to NSC. Yet, whereas the latter attends 
to the metamorphoses of  capitalism, the former takes as its object the study 
of  changes in a larger domain, the ‘domain of  life’, or – more precisely – ‘the 
transformations that have affected what is habitually called the ‘domains of  
life’ and particularly the conditions of  reproduction, gestation, and birth 
(Boltanski, 2013 [2004]: 11). The period under consideration coincides 
with that of  NSC since an essential vector of  change is the legalization of  
abortion in many European countries during the 1960s and 1970s, the effects 
of  which were most notable in the last third of  the twentieth century. Let us 
consider how this sociology of  reproduction has led Boltanski to proceed with 
a surprising theoretical composite.
1. Hybrid Composite: Linking Pragmatic Sociology,  
Structuralism, and Phenomenology
One of  the aims pursued by Boltanski here is to bring together pragmatic 
sociology, structuralism, and phenomenology. This opening towards other 
theoretical horizons imposes itself  because, in a way, the polities model stood at 
odds with an unjustifiable practice. Obviously, the incompatible constraints to which 
abortion gave rise could not become the object of  a legitimate agreement or of  
moral justification. Confronted with such inherent limits for the polities model, 
Boltanski is led to solicit the contribution of  other theoretical perspectives. 
The main goal is to construct a new analytic framework that would enable the 
convergence of  ‘three distinct approaches linked with intellectual traditions 
that have difficulty finding accord’ (Boltanski, 2013 [2004]: 16). I will briefly 
describe the first two approaches and examine the third in more detail.
2. Grammaticality
The concept of  grammaticality refers to the structures and constraints weighing 
on the actions of  individuals. We are not far from the grammar of  polities, 
although it is important to highlight a modification in the very definition of  the 
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notion of  ‘grammar’, something that has de facto consequences at the analytic 
level. We know that the EW model borrows the notion of  ‘competence’ from 
Chomsky’s theory of  ‘generative grammar’, aiming to construct a grammar 
of  forms of  agreement out of  the actors’ justifications (Nachi, 2006a: 39–43). 
This borrowing refers to the classical model of  generative grammar that was 
developed in the 1960s (Chomsky, 1965). Many formulations have ensued since, 
leading Chomsky to propose a new and more elaborate version of  his model. 
There is no space here to go over the different phases of  the ‘Chomskyan 
revolution’ extensively described by the linguist Jean-Élie Boltanski (2002). Of  
the succession of  models, I will mention only the optimality theory, amongst the 
most characteristic aspects of  the last version of  generative grammar. J.-E. 
Boltanski made use of  it in order to construct a grammar of  reproduction. As 
he remarks, 
[Optimality theory] drew attention to a fundamental notion, which linguistics 
had ignored – namely, the conflictual exigencies at the heart of  language, the 
grammars of  different languages being nothing other than efforts to resolve these 
conflicts. (Boltanski, J.-E., 2002: 160; my translation) 
With regard to reproduction, this grammar refers to the constraints that weigh 
on the ‘production of  new human beings’ in order for them to come into the 
world and find a place amongst other humans. Clearly, this first approach is 
devoid of  historical dimension, and has no anchor in the experience of  actors, 
hence the necessity to deploy an approach likely to remedy such deficiencies. 
3. Historicity
The concept of  ‘historicity’ can be used to confer a diachronic dimension 
to the competence model, conceiving of  it along the axis of  an extended 
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the historical process that enabled their stabilization and transformation. The 
goal is to show how these constraints
were manifested different[ly] and have therefore weighed differently on the 
actions of  individuals that were subjected to them in different historical contexts. 
(Boltanski, 2013 [2004]: 18) 
In order to account for the historical character of  the competence model, 
two paths are explored by the sociologist: one relies on the work of  historians, 
demographers, and archive documents; the other is based on biographical 
narratives and testimonies written by individuals, in this case women, who 
lived through an experience of  abortion. In the first case, Boltanski could open 
with a reference to modes of  arrangement that came into being at different 
historical periods (arrangements with God, with relatives, with the state); in the 
second case, interviews with women opened a perspective towards new types of  
arrangement (the parental project) as it has taken shape since the 1970s.
In addition to the grammatical and historical levels of  analysis, a third 
approach concerns itself  primarily with giving an account of  the singular 
experience of  individuals. 
4. Phenomenology
In many ways, the last approach is the most original, but also the most 
surprising. Its analysis is not restricted to the grammatical level of  
reproduction’s constraints; instead, it focuses on the experience of  abortion. This 
dimension is examined in Chapter 7, in which the author puts in place an 
analytic framework which may reduce to one form of  description an ensemble 
of  practices and experiences that reflect very diverse trajectories and trials. 
Indeed, Boltanski is not satisfied with the elucidation of  structures and logics 
that underlie the competence model of  reproduction, an endeavour that 
involves no interrogation of  the practices themselves. Instead, he seeks to 
establish strong connections between the rules and the logics, which govern the 
grammar of  reproduction, and their being tested in the lived world. The goal 
is quite substantial, since the ambition is to transcend the opposition between structure 
and phenomenon. Moreover, the perspective adopted does not aim to confirm the 
gap that may be discerned between the rule and the practice, the structure and 
the phenomenon. On the contrary, it aims to show the continuities between the 
two registers and, furthermore, the extensions of  the first into the second. 
Instead of  underscoring the distance between the lessons taught by the grammatical 
method and by the experiential approach, as is often the case when following 
methodologies of  the structural type, we have rather tried to show how the two 
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approaches could converge, or even how it was possible to find a new, out of  the 
experience, albeit described in another language, the very elements whose pertinence 
was demonstrated by the grammatical method. (Boltanski, 2013 [2004]: 17)
Here there is a kind of  dialectic established between the structural and the 
phenomenal, which the sociological method should scrutinize closely. Such at least 
is the task Boltanski set for himself  in order to construct his analytic framework 
of  reproduction. The phenomenological approach consists in attending to the 
experience of  women who lived through abortion in order to describe the way 
in which they have suffered it in their flesh. It is obviously to account for the 
singularity of  this experience suffered in the flesh that Boltanski borrowed an atypical 
path in contemporary phenomenology, that of  Michel Henry.
We know well that when experience, perception, or the body are interrogated, 
one naturally turns to the Phenomenology of  Perception of  Merleau-Ponty (2012 
[1945]). Here this is not the case. And, indeed, this is not the case for a good 
reason: at stake is not the body in the phenomenological sense but, rather, 
the flesh. Pregnancy is a state that is incarnate in the flesh. It is in the ‘guts’, 
if  one may put it that way. Here, too, just as with the establishment of  a 
grammar of  reproduction, the concept of  flesh becomes the keystone of  this 
phenomenological perspective. 
Granted, the path is tortuous and filled with obstacles, but it may be the only 
one that can allow a refinement of  the concept of  practice in the articulation of  
models of  competence, which are established from a position of  exteriority and 
the narratives that people offer for their lives, when ‘setting the plot’, they ask 
themselves about the intentions and motives that were theirs in the action. That is 
how the conception of  the flesh, set to work, in the first part, in a strictly structural 
manner, since its determinations are established exclusively in opposition to the 
concept of  speech – to ground the distinction between reproduction by the flesh 
and reproduction by speech – this conception is reworked and elaborated anew 
with a different orientation, in which the aim is to account for the experience of  
the flesh during pregnancy, as a dimension of  the relation to the body proper. 
(Boltanski, 2013 [2004]: 17; italics in original) 
In this context, Boltanski refers to the phenomenology of  birth developed by 
Henry, which aims to show the necessity of  substituting a definition of  
birth as ‘coming into the world’ with ‘coming into life’ (Henry, 2003: 131; 
my translation). He also borrows the concept of  auto-affection, which locates the 
test of  life in pure immanence: 
How does life engender ego within itself, making it into a living ego? It does so 
insofar as it engenders itself  and the manner in which it does so. Life engenders 
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itself  in the process of  its eternal auto-affection, a process in which it comes into 
itself, crushes against itself, tests itself, delights in itself, as it is nothing but the 
eternal felicity of  this pure delight in itself. (Henry, 2003: 132)
We are on the hither side of  the separation between subject and object (Boltanski, 
2013 [2004]: 268). 
Let us turn, in conclusion, to the question of  how, in On Critique, Boltanski 
overcomes pragmatic sociology in order to establish a new theoretical 
compromise.
III. The Compromise between ‘Critical Sociology’  
and the ‘Sociology of  Critique’
It may seem incongruous to ask about an overcoming of  pragmatic sociology, 
and all the more so at a moment when this style has not yet been stabilized. 
Yet the question seems relevant if  one seeks to grasp the mechanisms that 
enable the evolution of  this sociology such as it is found in the latest works 
of  Boltanski. Furthermore, the question enables us to measure the tension 
or the theoretical distance which separates the original model from the new 
analytic framework that sustains a sociology of  emancipation (Boltanski, 2011 
[2009]). Following the extension and hybridization of  the general model of  
polities, which we have considered above, the point is not to demand the return 
to ‘critical sociology’, particularly because it follows a marked insistence on the 
passage away from it and towards a ‘sociology of  critique’, often presented as 
one of  the prominent elements of  the new pragmatic style.
Obviously, after On Critique we are witnessing the emergence of  a new 
theoretical configuration which should lead to the pure and simple overcoming 
of  the pragmatic style, culminating either in a theoretical model that breaks 
with the polities, or with the invention of  a theoretical compromise that would 
allow yoking together two antagonistic sociological approaches.1 In the latter 
case, it seems appropriate to ask whether this new composite is still related 
to the pragmatic style or whether, on the contrary, it would constitute a sui 
generis style. The stakes are quite high and Boltanski’s purpose in On Critique 
is ambitious. The range and depth of  analysis concerns sociology, social 
critique, society, the social order, domination, institutions, and, last but not 
least, emancipation.
Pragmatic sociology took as its object the study of  social critique in the 
ordinary sense. The sociologist attends to the way in which critique is deployed 
in daily life, the way it demands legitimate justifications on the part of  actors 
that are also its authors. As a result, he is not bound to assume a critical 
posture a priori since he is supposed to proceed directly to a thick description 
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of  the operations of  critique. This first axiom of  pragmatic sociology is once 
again challenged in favour of  a new exigency, which associates description 
and critique. For these are not opposed at all. On the contrary, they nourish 
each other and evolve in a parallel fashion, a tension that entangles them 
further. It becomes impossible to dissociate ‘description’ from ‘critique’, and 
‘critical sociology’ from the ‘sociology of  critique’. Who, one may ask, would 
be interested in sociology for sociology’s sake (the way one speaks of  ‘art for 
art’s sake’ [l’art pour l’art])? The answer is as follows: ‘It remains the case that 
critique’s dependence on sociology has as its corollary sociology’s dependence 
on critique’ (Boltanski, 2011 [2009]: 16).
The entanglement of  sociology and critique leads the sociologist to take 
upon him or herself  the critical vocation of  sociological work. Boltanski’s 
ambition, not a minor one, is to render compatible ‘critical sociology’ and the 
‘sociology of  critique’. Faced with this task, the challenge is to explore the extent 
to which the critique of  sociology can contribute to a redeployment of  ‘critical 
sociology’ (Boltanski, 2011 [2009]: 29). That is one of  the main arguments 
of  the research programme elaborated in On Critique. As he discusses the 
conceptual foundations of  critical theories, the author underscores, amongst 
other things, the problems raised by the use of  the notion of  domination in 
‘critical sociology’. For Bourdieu, the sociology of  domination grants a central 
role to ‘symbolic violence’,2 an essential characteristic of  which being that it is 
euphemized and unrecognized by those subjected to it. From this perspective, 
ideology would be that which conceals forms of  domination and exploitation; 
actors would be oblivious, blinded by illusion and, moreover, alienated. In 
short, actors are dominated without knowing it, without being conscious 
of  their domination. Only the enlightened sociologist would be capable of  
unveiling the underlying mechanisms of  the forms of  domination, something 
that naturally grants him or her an overarching position. The enterprise of  
emancipation depends less on the reflexive activity of  individuals than on 
sociological practice itself. 
The use of  the notion of  domination by critical theories is faulty for its 
vagueness, its extensive, undetermined character, which leads to a truncated 
version of  the social world. As Boltanski rightly remarks, ‘By dint of  seeing 
domination everywhere, the way is paved for those who do not want to see it 
anywhere’ (Boltanski, 2011 [2009]: 46). Hence we are confronted with the need 
to reflect upon issues arising not only from domination and exploitation but 
also from emancipation. In order to do so, we need to readdress the concept of  
critique. For Boltanski, the goal is to establish a new programme for a ‘pragmatic 
sociology of  critique’ that rejects the notion of  an asymmetry between 
‘enlightened sociologists’, on the one hand, and ordinary actors, oblivious to 
his situation and dwelling in illusion, on the other. Therefore, the strategy the 
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sociologist must adopt will consist in ‘returning to things themselves’ on the 
basis of  observation, description, and the interpretation of  situations in which critique 
is deployed (Boltanski, 2011 [2009]: 24). Only then – with the sociologist 
adopting the point of  view of  the actor – does it become possible to conduct 
critical operations out of  a ‘sociology of  critique’. As Boltanski underscores,
[T]he metacritical position will therefore consist in making use of  the point 
of  view of  the actors – that is to say, base itself  on their moral sense and, in 
particular, on their ordinary sense of  justice, to expose the discrepancy between 
the social world as it is and as it should be in order to satisfy people’s moral 
expectations. (Boltanski, 2011 [2009]: 30) 
Such a strategy would make ‘critical sociology’ and the ‘sociology of  critique’ 
compatible, enabling the formation of  a compromise between sociology and social 
critique. Both programmes have inherent limits. Both are confronted with a 
problem raised by the relation between metacritique and ordinary critique. 
Whereas ‘critical sociology’ is constructed exclusively around an overarching 
position for critique, ignoring the point of  view of  the actors, ‘pragmatic 
sociology’ is concerned mainly with the operations of  ordinary critique 
and lacks any metacritical objective. Each programme errs by excess and 
insufficiency, hence the advantage of  putting them to work together, by 
articulating the conceptual architecture of  two sociological theories. And it 
would be a mistake to think that this is any kind of  collage or juxtaposition of  
two theoretical frameworks. On the contrary, there is a guiding will to establish 
a relationship between sociology and critique, metacritique and ordinary critique. 
To be credible today, sociologies directed towards a metacritique of  domination 
should draw the lessons of  past failures and […] equip themselves with an 
analytical framework that makes it possible to integrate the contributions of  
what we have called the overarching programme, on the one hand, and the pragmatic 
programme, on the other. From the overarching programme this framework would 
take the possibility, obtained by the stance of  exteriority, of  challenging reality, 
of  providing the dominated with tools for resisting fragmentation – and this by 
offering them a picture of  the social order and also principles of  equivalence on 
which they could seize to make comparisons between them and increase their 
strength by combining into collectives. But from the pragmatic programme 
such a framework should pay attention to the activities and critical competences 
of  actors and acknowledgement of  the pluralistic expectations, which, in 
contemporary democratic-capitalist societies, seem to occupy a central position 
in the critical sense of  actors, including the most dominated among them. 
(Boltanski, 2011 [2009]: 48; italics in original) 
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In short, the purpose is to forge a compromise between ‘critical sociology’ and the 
‘pragmatic sociology of  critique’ in order to grasp the critical practices of  human 
actors. It will be understood that the great benefit of  such a theoretical 
compromise is to avoid theoretical, and epistemological, polarization between 
the overarching and the pragmatic conceptions of  social critique. Critique can, 
therefore, be apprehended in a dual perspective, which takes account of  the 
two registers meta/ordinary, both interdependent and mutually nourishing.
In order to understand the mechanisms of  critique and its normative 
underpinnings, Boltanski introduces a fundamental distinction between ‘reality’ 
and ‘world’. According to him, critique can be deployed only at the level of  reality. 
Indeed, the question of  uncertainty opens the path of  critique. We find ourselves, 
therefore, in a two-dimensional or twin-level plane: on the one hand, reality, as a 
social construction – referring to what is natural, what is confounded by order and is 
oriented towards permanence; on the other hand, the world, in the Wittgensteinian 
sense – everything that occurs, the ‘flow of  life’, marked with uncertainty and incessant 
change. The world does not transcend reality. It is immanent. Critique is possible 
because of  the gap, the tension that separates reality from world, permanence and 
change, the certainty of  what is and the uncertainty of  what occurs. 
Here the establishment of  a theoretical compromise finds one of  its 
main justifications: to provide a new analytic framework that absorbs the 
contradiction between sociology and social critique, rendering description and 
critique compatible. Boltanski turns away from the sociology of  domination 
and from pragmatic sociology in their strong versions. He pleads for a new, 
hybrid, and composite compromise that affords the power of  institutions a 
central role.3 This follows the distinction he had proposed earlier between the 
weak and strong use of  the notion of  habitus dear to Bourdieu (Boltanski, 2003). 
The question of  uncertainty, crucial for criticism of  the notion of  habitus, is also 
the point of  departure towards establishing the new theoretical compromise. 
Ultimately, the analysis I have sketched should furnish a recognition of  the 
transformation of  perspectives necessary for a sociology that aims at emancipation. 
Concluding Remarks
The originality of  Boltanski’s sociological project resides, first of  all, in the fact 
that each of  his works initiates a new, quasi-autonomous, even self-sufficient, 
research programme. Each relies also on specific and pointed empirical 
investigations, offering, as it were, a whole ‘paradigm’ of  its own, from the 
construction of  the object to the conceptual apparatus mobilized by way of  
the requisite methodological approach. In a sense, each work marks a decisive 
stage in the evolution of  Boltanski’s thought. Carried by an innovative impulse, 
Boltanski has been consistent in revising the theoretical framework of  his 
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analyses, remaining as rebellious vis-à-vis all forms of  orthodoxy and refusing to 
confine himself  to any model, his own included. It is this state of  mind, I believe, 
that has led him to the inflections, hybridization, reversals, and overcoming which I have 
attempted to sketch in their most striking developments. Understandably, it is 
not easy to follow such an intellectual trajectory, as the author’s positions have 
not ceased to evolve. 
Besides, from a theoretical perspective we are not finished with the surprises. 
In fact, following the inflections performed on the analytic framework of  the 
polities model, the drawing out of  a new city in NSC, we have had to contend 
with a true reversal of  perspective. One objective of  The Foetal Condition, and not 
the least amongst them, was to bring together pragmatic sociology, structuralism, and 
the phenomenological approach. If  NSC was recognized as ambitious, and rightly so, 
The Foetal Condition does not lack in audacity or originality, even if  the reaction 
of  the sociologists was lukewarm at best. With On Critique, an additional step 
is made, leading to a theoretical compromise between ‘critical sociology’ and 
the ‘sociology of  critique’. In any case, to gather in one sociological gesture 
all these theoretical perspectives – known to be quite different at the very 
least, even irreconcilable – while confronting the sacred cows of  disciplinary 
borders, is no doubt unusual, and in many respects laudable. This is not to say 
that there is no unity, or a shared problematic, to the work as a whole. The 
common thread, easily discernible, is the will to trace the grammars that sustain 
the operations of  social critique and the ordinary sense of  justice. 
Boltanski’s intellectual trajectory, marked by so many inflections and 
theoretical ‘de-centrings’, is not lacking in audacity. Having taken his distance 
from Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ (with whom he was one of  the closest 
collaborators) in order to develop, amongst other things, a ‘sociology of  critique’, 
he is now in the process of  drawing back to the former, in order to construct an 
analytic framework that enables him to articulate two of  the most important 
sociological programmes today. But in spite of  its ambition and its innovation, this 
enterprise raises many questions. One must ask whether, as a scientific discipline, 
sociology has the vocation to work towards a renewal of  society’s emancipatory 
practices. One is also entitled to ask what remains ‘pragmatic’ in this new 
theoretical compromise: if  one associates the pragmatic style to the early model 
of  polities, the new analytic framework proposed by Boltanski could be said to 
effectuate an overcoming, even a break, with regard to the initial model. On the 
other hand, if  pragmatic sociology means insistence on a concern with ordinary 
critique, one could acknowledge the existence of  a very relative continuity with 
the initial model. In the final analysis, the ‘new pragmatic sociology of  critique’ 
aims at something entirely different from the mere description of  the operations 
of  ordinary critique. At stake is the very emancipation of  society!
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Notes
1 For an extended reflection on ‘compromise’, see Nachi (2004, 2001).
2 On the question of  ‘symbolic violence’, see Terray (2002).
3 The reflections on the concept of  ‘institution’ are of  great importance to our 
understanding of  the mechanisms of  critique. As Boltanski writes:
[T]he possibility of  critique is inscribed, in some sense latently, in the tensions 
contained in the very functioning of  institutions […]. Critique is the only bulwark 
against the domination liable to be practised by institutions. (Boltanski, 2011 
[2009]: 83)
  Due to the limited space of  this chapter, I confine myself  to this brief  remark and 
refer the reader to Chapter 3 of  On Critique, entitled ‘The Power of  Institutions’.
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